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The approval of methodologies and individual projects in the context of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is often an issue of national interest. Decisions of the 
CDM Executive Board (EB) can thus be expected to be highly politicized. Based on data for 
about 250 methodologies and about 1000 projects discussed by the EB so far, this paper 
provides a first econometric analysis of this hypothesis. The results suggest that indeed, along 
with formal quality criteria, political-economic variables determine the final EB decision. 
This is most clearly the case for decisions on CDM projects which are far less transparent 
than those on CDM methodologies. In particular, EB membership of the country or countries 
concerned raises the chances of a project to be approved. Moreover, clearly, with rising 
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  11. Introduction 
 
The CDM Executive Board (EB) is an institution within the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) system defined by the Kyoto Protocol. Its 20 members and 
alternates are elected by the Conference of the Parties and meet in about monthly intervals to 
approve individual projects to be carried out in the framework of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Moreover, they are responsible for the approval of methodologies used to 
assess current and future projects’ additionality and to calculate as well as monitor their 
emission reductions.  
 
As the CDM allows industrialized countries (listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol) to 
receive Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from projects in developing countries, the 
assessment of additionality is vital to determine whether emission reductions through these 
projects would not have happened anyway. The approval of non-additional projects leads to 
benefits of the investor in the industrialized and/or in the developing country concerned, 
depending on resource flows agreed between these partners, to the detriment of global 
protection against climate change. The type of projects and the methodologies proposed 
depend to a large extent on the developing countries’ natural resources and the technological 
paths currently used for energy and industrial production. The approval of specific 
methodologies and project types therefore often becomes an issue of national interest. 
Decisions of the CDM Executive Board are thus expected to be highly politicized. 
 
At the same time, the evaluation of whether a methodology is adequate to correctly calculate 
emission reductions and properly assess additionality, and whether a specific project meets 
these requirements, requires important technical knowledge which cannot be expected from 
EB members who are usually delegated from national bureaucracies. Special committees of 
researchers and other experts are therefore set in place to analyze these technical questions. 
The responsible technical committee for methodologies is the Methodology Panel (Meth 
Panel); for individual projects, it is the Registration and Issuance Team (RIT). Formally, both 
bodies have no decision making power; all decisions are taken by the EB. While Meth Panel 
recommendations are reported in openly accessible minutes of the meeting, there is no 
transparency about RIT recommendations. It follows that EB decisions on methodologies can 
be easily compared with the Meth Panel recommendations while this is not the case for 
decisions on individual projects. In addition, positions on individual projects are exchanged in 
the EB behind closed doors despite the general rule that EB meetings should be public 
(UNFCCC 2006, Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex I, rules 26 and 27, p. 38).  
 
Given high stakeholder interest in both methodologies and individual projects, the lack of 
transparency raises doubts about the extent to which the scientific and technical assessment 
indeed drives final EB decisions. In addition, it suggests that political-economic determinants 
of decision making should be particularly strong for individual project decisions because 
transparency is higher for methodologies. 
 
Based on about 250 methodologies and about 1000 projects discussed by the EB until October 
2007, we empirically investigate the relevance of political-economic versus technical 
determinants of EB decision making. In this context, we focus on the role of EB members’ 
nationality, the relevance of the specialized technical committees, change over time due to 
increasing numbers of methodologies and projects, and the degree of transparency of the EB 
decision making process. 
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hypotheses are derived building on the broader literature in political economy, on evidence 
for other international organizations, as well as on anecdotal evidence reported about the EB 
in the context of individual methodology or project discussions. 
 
In Section 2, the theoretical ideas will be outlined in more detail and allow us to motivate our 
hypotheses. Section  3 then discusses the data and the estimation method we use for our 
econometric analysis. Section  4 presents the results. Finally, Section  5 derives some 
conclusions and policy recommendations for the further institutional development of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat and its CDM Executive Board. 
 
 
2. The political economy of EB decision making: A brief theoretical foundation 
 
According to the rules of the Kyoto Protocol, a CDM project may be accepted only if it 
generates emission reductions which are additional to reductions that would have happened 
anyway (additionality). For instance, if the investment into a new power plant replacing an 
old one leads to higher energy efficiency and reduced emissions, this project does not 
automatically qualify for the CDM. If the replacement is economically attractive for mere 
efficiency reasons, the investment will have take place anyway, and no CERs should be 
issued for it. However, any investor planning such a project has an obvious incentive in trying 
to argue that it is additional, because the CERs potentially generated can have a considerable 
financial value for him. For example, a wind power plant with an investment cost of 
100 million € in a moderately attractive wind regime could annually generate CERs of a value 
of 6 million €. In extreme cases (e.g. industrial gas projects), the value of CERs generated in a 
single year can even be a multiple of the initial investment cost. Thus, there is reason to 
believe that investors and other stakeholders are strongly interested in influencing EB 
decision making. Let us now consider the potential interests in a more systematic way. 
 
These interests may arise in different countries: the host countries, usually developing 
countries, but also including individual high income countries like South Korea, and the buyer 
countries which are industrialized countries with emission reduction targets as defined in 
Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (Annex-B countries). The actual investor may be a national or 
international firm or a public institution. The project may be developed in the host country 
alone (unilateral CDM) or result from cooperation between a host and a buyer country 
investor. 
 
If a project is registered by the EB and becomes operational, it generates CERs. In case of 
unilateral CDM, as no buyer country is directly involved in the project investment, the CERs 
can be sold by the host country investor at market prices. Otherwise, the benefits arising from 
the CERs are shared between the host and the buyer country investors whereby the shares 
depend upon the negotiation power of each party. The buyer country investor can then either 
also sell his part of the CERs on the market or use it to compensate his domestic emissions. In 
the case of bilateral CDM, the host country can also benefit from technology transfer.  
 
The above discussion shows that both private investors and governments themselves may 
have an interest in their CDM projects to be approved. As private firms cannot directly 
influence policy making at the international level, we assume that they will lobby their 
governments for support. 
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also become an important business for various kinds of consultancy and auditing services. 
There are consultancy services required for the development of project documentation, which 
is then to be audited (“validated”) before a project may even request registration from the EB. 
Consultancy services are also required for the design of CDM methodologies. The 
organizations involved in this business are often private consultancy firms for which the 
success of getting a major project registered or of getting a methodology approved may be 
crucial for acquiring new orders in the future. We can therefore expect that these 
consultancies – just as private investors directly involved in CDM projects – will lobby their 
governments to ensure the success of their proposals. 
 
Finally, international organizations become involved in the process. They frequently act as an 
intermediate buyer pooling CDM projects to establish funds with the resulting CERs equally 
benefiting all the members of the fund. The pioneer and most well known example is the 
Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) of the World Bank operational since April 2000. The World 
Bank has opened up ten other funds since then (World Bank 2007, pp. 4-5). For the World 
Bank, this field represents a challenging new area of diversification. Of course, just as 
governments and private investors, the Bank is interested in positive EB decisions for its 
projects. Firstly, it has to defend its image of a highly professional think tank in all areas of 
international development. And secondly, it might not be able to obtain subscriptions for new 
funds if projects in the portfolio of existing funds face difficulties in the registration process.  
 
Moreover international organizations compete with private consultancies in designing CDM 
methodologies. Again the World Bank is at the forefront of activities in the area, and the 
stakes in favorable EB decisions on its methodologies are at least as high as for individual 
projects. 
 
In general, for most of the actors described above, one might expect the interest in having 
methodologies passed to be even higher than the interest in the registration of individual 
projects. The reason is that there are fewer methodologies, and that each of the methodologies 
predetermines the CDM potential of a whole group of individual projects. At the same time, 
the stakes of individual countries in a given methodology depend on the geographical spread 
of the relevant technology. A methodology for hydro power, for instance, will be applicable in 
many countries, so that many countries will be similarly interested. A methodology for N2O 
reduction from adipic acid production, however, can be used only in China, South Korea and 
Brazil because other countries do not apply this technology. The approval of methodologies 
relevant for technologies only in a small number of countries may benefit some countries 
(and  /  or their investors) to the detriment of others – as it can attract investment which 
substitutes for investment elsewhere. We therefore expect debates about this type of 
methodologies to be the most highly politicized. 
 
We also expect some differences in the political interest in different type of projects. Here, 
however, interest can be assumed to simply depend upon project size. For small projects, even 
the official texts provide for a different treatment with faster procedures and less restrictions 
concerning project evaluation. Depending on project type, small projects have to meet one of 
the following thresholds: (i) renewable energy: <15 MW; (ii) energy efficiency: <60GWh 
(before December 2006: <15GWh); (iii) all other projects: <60 000 CERs (before December 
2006: project emissions < 15 000 t CO2-equivalent). Small projects can be distinguished from 
other projects through a specific methodology code number.  
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making? We adopt a simple rational choice perspective and consider that EB members take 
their decisions after an evaluation of the political and economic costs and benefits of either 
alternative. Obviously, they may also follow normative environmental objectives, but for 
simplicity and to sharpen the argument, this will not be explicitly considered here. 
 
In line with the general literature on decision making in international organizations we expect 
that countries directly represented among the ten members or ten alternates of the EB have a 
higher chance to influence decision making in favor of their governments, private investors or 
consultancies. While only the members have a formal right to vote, decisions are usually 
based on a consensus so that alternates, who have the same right to participate in the debate, 
can be assumed to be similarly influential.  
 
In contrast to other international organizations where the overriding dominance of individual 
member states is a frequently analyzed topic (see e.g. Fleck and Kilby 2006 for the World 
Bank or Barrow and Lee 2005 for the IMF), voting power is distributed equally over all 
members in the EB. Nevertheless, there could be differences in the effective influence an 
individual EB member may be able to exert. This influence may be related to the overall 
importance of a country which can raise its negotiating power (e.g. through informally linking 
up the issue at stake with cooperation or pressure in other fields). Moreover, it may be related 
to different levels of effort linked to a different strength of incentives. While all countries can 
benefit from the CDM, the potential for such benefits may be quite different. For instance, 
relatively more advanced developing countries which are generally attractive for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) are usually also more attractive as host countries for the CDM 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007). On the buyer country side, it could be relevant which 
obligations for emission reductions the countries took up under the Kyoto Protocol, and to 
what extent economic, technical and political constraints hinder them to meet these 
obligations domestically. Moreover, it may be relevant, whether a country already has a 
strong position in FDI which could enhance the potential interest for the CDM. 
 
Similarly, even countries not represented in the EB may have higher chances to get their 
projects and methodologies adopted if they are generally powerful players and if there is a 
high incentive for them to engage in influencing the decision making process.  
 
As far as international organizations are concerned, they are never directly represented by an 
EB member country. However, the methodologies and projects they develop are generally 
relevant for a number of countries, some of which will almost certainly be represented in the 
EB. Moreover, the World Bank as the predominant international organization involved in the 
field is present everywhere in the debates and has a strong information and lobbying power. 
Finally, it may use networks within the international bureaucracy to reinforce its position. 
 
In general, the extent to which EB members will favor political-economic over technical or 
scientific quality considerations must be expected to depend upon the institutional setting of 
the decision making process. In particular, the transparency of the process appears to be an 
important variable here. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have taken a critical 
stance towards the CDM because they fear that anything but emission reductions at home can 
easily lead to an abuse and to CERs generated for projects which are neither additional nor 
sustainable (WWF 2007, p.  2; CDM Watch 2005). Clearly, under such conditions, a 
divergence between EB decision making and the technical advice of the relevant advisory 
committees will be closely scrutinized and may give raise to protests which can harm the 
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when the information on both technical advice and EB decision making are openly available.  
 
As already mentioned above, according to official rules, EB deliberations should be open to 
the public. Parts of the discussions in EB meetings are even downloadable as a video on the 
internet (UNFCCC 2007a). However, the EB can decide to exclude the public in exceptional 
cases (see Annex 1 for the exact formulation of this clause). Interestingly, these exceptions 
have become the rule in the case of deliberations and decisions about individual CDM 
projects. Therefore, while the process is widely transparent for decisions about 
methodologies, the only information available on individual projects is the actual decision. 
For CDM projects, there is no information on country positions or on arguments exchanged. 
In fact, even the initial quality assessment by the Registration and Issuance Team (RIT) is 
considered confidential information, so that there is no basis for comparison for any external 
observer. The opposite is true for methodologies, for which the initial Meth Panel 
recommendation is recorded in the official minutes of the meeting which are easily accessible 
on the UNFCCC website. Given the political cost of criticism, we may thus expect that 
political-economic determinants of EB decision making will be stronger for decisions on 
projects than for decisions on methodologies. 
 
Finally, it appears plausible to assume that it is in the joint interest of all actors potentially 
benefiting from the CDM to show that the mechanism works. Policy makers may also wish to 
show that, for the simple reason that they have taken a positive decision on the introduction of 
this market mechanism in the first place – a decision which would otherwise be considered by 
the general public as a failure. In order to show that the mechanism works, in the first place, a 
certain volume of CDM activities is required, i.e. sufficient demand for CDM projects must 
be generated and a relevant number of projects have to become operational. In the initial 
years, this may lead to a rather mild scrutiny of methodologies and projects submitted for 
registration. At the same time, in the long run, a decision making body cannot always let 
everything pass if it wants to be taken seriously by any outside observer. In addition, the 
CDM might be rejected as a whole if the assessment procedure is deemed to be unreliable. 
Therefore, the selection process can be expected to become stricter over time. 
 
Pulling together the different arguments motivated through the theoretical considerations 
above, we can sum up the discussion with the following hypotheses: 
 
(1) EB decisions tend to favor projects and methodologies relevant for EB member 
countries (their governments, private investors or consultancies).  
(2) Countries for which the CDM has a high potential and countries which are generally 
powerful players have a higher chance to see their projects and methodologies 
accepted by the EB. 
(3) If the World Bank is involved in individual projects or methodologies, this also raises 
their chance to be accepted. 
(4) Due to the lack of transparency, political-economic as opposed to technical or 
scientific considerations are more important for EB decisions on individual projects 
than for decisions on methodologies. 
(5) Political-economic considerations are more important for those methodologies which 
are relevant only for a limited number of countries, and for big rather than for small 
projects. 
(6) EB decision making becomes stricter over time.  
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3. Data and estimation methods 
 
We use a self-compiled dataset based on data from the UNEP Risoe Center (URC 2007) to 
empirically test our hypotheses. Our data contains qualitative information on the type and 
status of all projects and methodologies available on the CDM website of the UNFCCC on 
October 31, 2007. As we are interested in the determinants of EB decision making, we select 
only those cases where the status indicates that some EB decision has already been taken. 
This includes a total of 985 projects and 239 methodologies (including 31 afforestation and 
reforestation methods).  
 
For these projects and CDM methodologies, the original URC dataset contains information on 
the host and (in case of multilateral CDM) the buyer countries, the names of the relevant 
consultancies or international organizations, the assessment of methodologies by the Meth 
Panel, the intermediate and final assessments of the EB, as well as the relevant dates for 
submission of and decisions on methodologies. For individual projects, only the date of the 
request for registration is available.  
 
We expanded this dataset in many ways. First, we looked up the EB decision date for projects 
from individual project design documents (PDDs) available online (see UNFCCC 2007b). 
Then, we went through the minutes of EB meetings (UNFCCC 2007a) to find out about 
individual members for each year. Their nationality was then used to create dummy variables 
indicating host or buyer country representation in the EB. Using PDDs and relevant company 
websites, we also determine the country of the relevant consultants and equally created a 
dummy indicating EB membership.  
 
Moreover, to capture the political relevance of a methodology, we created a categorical 
variable with ranges from 1 (applicability in all countries, i.e. low potential for political 
competition) to 5 (applicable only in a small number of countries, i.e. high potential for 
political competition). Thus, the higher the value of the variable, the higher is the political 
relevance of the decision. 
 
We further derived the gap between Annex B countries’ Kyoto emission budgets and the 
projected emission levels during the commitment period. This variable indicates the expected 
need for CERs. For EU countries, it was based on forecasts by the European Environment 
Agency (2006), and for Canada and Japan on projections by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(2007) (only energy-related CO2 emissions). All remaining information was obtained through 
linear extrapolations based on UNFCCC inventory data for 2000-2005 (UNFCCC 2007c). 
 
Finally, we merged this data with additional country information on GDP, FDI, trade, CO2 
emissions and education from the World Bank’s (2006) World Development Indicators. All 
these variables are selected for the year 2000 which is the year just before CDM activities 
started in 2001 and therefore should be the year at which decision makers would orient 
themselves when considering the power of a country or the relevance of CDM as a 
complement to FDI. As the variation of this data over the years 2000 to 2006 is negligible as 
compared to the cross-country variation relevant here, and as information on these variables is 
taken into account with a lag which may vary from one EB member to the other, we consider 
that it is misleading to seek additional precision by entering this information for individual 
years of EB decision making. Using only information for the year 2000 also allows us to 
impute missing values with values for adjacent years. For tertiary education, for which 
information was missing for some developing countries even after this replacement 
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rates and GDP per capita. 
 
We consider that the educational variable may be important as a proxy for the quality of 
projects and methodologies. This appears to be relevant especially in the context of CDM 
projects as no direct control for quality is available in the data. As discussed above, the Meth 
Panel assessment is available for methodologies, whereas the RIT assessment is confidential 
and remains unpublished.  
 
However, simply considering host country education levels does not seem sufficient to control 
for project quality. We therefore derive a new quality indicator based on a review of all 985 
individual PDDs. As one of the authors is himself a member of the RIT, he knows the 
standard criteria to be respected and the results of all RIT assessments he carried out himself. 
The criteria include the credibility of the additionality test implemented by the project, as well 
as the correctness of the application of the baseline and monitoring methodology. Based on 
the information available from the PDDs we define a categorical variable with categories 
from 1 (lowest quality) to 5 (highest quality) for each individual project. 
 
Let us now consider the information available for our dependent variable, i.e. for EB 
decisions. As we observe different stages of decision making, the scale is less obvious than 
one might think in the first place. Nevertheless, for both methodologies and projects, we can 
define one simple indicator for the final decision. It is a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the project is eventually registered or the methodology approved. 
 
To reflect more of the details of the decision making process, we code two additional 
categorical variables for projects and methodologies. For methodologies we define three 
categories. If a methodology is approved immediately, the value is 2. If the first decision is to 
request a revision, but the methodology is then accepted in the second round, the value is 1. If 
it is rejected or withdrawn, the value is 0. 
 
For projects, information on intermediate steps is available only as long as no final decision 
has been taken. As opposed to the simple rejection/registration variable, our categorical 
variable considers this intermediate stage in order not to lose so many observations. They are 
coded in line with the probabilities to proceed from this intermediate step to either rejection or 
registration. This leads to an overall coding from 0 to 4 where 4 stands for registration, 3 
stands for a request for review. This means that a minimum of three EB members ask for a 
review, but the EB has yet to decide whether the review will actually be implemented. In the 
past, in many cases no review actually took place and the project received a favorable 
decision by the EB despite the request of some of its members. The value of 2 indicates that 
the project is still quite close to being registered, but that some corrections have been 
requested. The value of 1 indicates that a review effectively takes place which somewhat 
indicates serious doubts about the project. Finally, the value of 0 stands for projects which 
were either rejected or withdrawn. The distribution of methodologies and projects into the 
different categories is presented in Table 1. 
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Methodologies Projects 
Approval dummy  Approval categories  Registration dummy  Registration categories 






OoRegistration (1)  827 
(93.9%) 
Registration (4)  827 
(84.0%)






































From the table, it becomes immediately apparent that decisions on methodologies have been 
stricter by far than decisions on individual projects. In fact, only 6% of all projects were 
rejected whereas this was the case for over 50% of the methodologies. 
 
The estimation procedure is predetermined by the type of our dependent variables. For 
multivariate regressions with the binary and the other categorical variables we use probit and 
ordered probit regressions respectively. We initially also estimated logit and ordered logit 
models, but tests on the functional form indicated that the normal distribution yields a better 
fit.  
 
We expect that observations on projects or methodologies of the same host countries may not 
be independent. Therefore, we explicitly take into account clusters at the host country level. 
One might also expect other limitations to the usual independence assumption. For instance, 
projects by the same buyer or validated by the same auditors may not be fully independent. 
However, for theoretical reasons (e.g. related to national technology) we expect this problem 
to be more relevant at the host country level. In addition, there is a large share of unilateral 
CDM for which buyer countries were not even defined when the EB decision was taken. To 
avoid an overly complex modeling framework with various overlapping clusters, we thus 
limit our analysis to the consideration of potential correlations within host countries. 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. EB decisions on methodologies 
 
Let us first consider EB decision making with respect to CDM methodologies. Table  2 
presents our regression results. Note that the number of observations is generally lower than 
in Table 1 because some of the afforestation and reforestation methodologies lack data on 
important explanatory variables. In Regression 1, we use a binary specification of the Meth 
Panel recommendation to control for the consideration of quality. It turns out that this variable 
is highly significant and, in fact, explains almost all of the variation in our outcome variable. 
Table 3 shows a cross tabulation of Meth Panel and EB decisions which demonstrates that 
indeed, only in three cases, the final decisions are not identical. Apparently, the EB closely 
follows Meth Panel recommendations. This implies that hardly any other variable has enough 
explanatory power to become significant. Only the year of the EB decision shows a 
significantly negative coefficient indicating that EB decisions have become stricter over time. 
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intermediate values between a clear yes or no (Regressions  2-4), we find slightly more 
difference between the assessments of the two committees. There are divergent views in 23 
cases, whereby, somewhat surprisingly, the EB tends to be stricter than the Meth Panel (more 
negative assessments in 18 out of 23 cases). 
 
Table 2: Determinants of methodology approval by the CDM Executive Board 
 

















0-2 (2 is directly 
accepted, 0 is 
rejected or 
withdrawn) 
Meth Panel recommendation (yes=1, no=0)  4.91*** 
(0.00) 
    
Initial Meth Panel recommendation  







Host country is EB member or alternate  0.26  0.50  0.50  -0.01 
 (0.48)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.95) 
Buyer country is EB member or alternate  -0.53  0.23  0.26  -0.05 
 (0.37)  (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.80) 










Consultant is an international organization  0.28  0.80*  0.83**  0.06 
 (0.66)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.87) 
Year of decisive EB decision  -0.36***  -0.23**  -0.24**  -0.03 
 (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.78) 
FDI, net inflows into host country  
(2000, % of GDP) 




FDI, net outflows from buyer country 
(2000, % of GDP) 




Constant 723.80***  466.57**  472.25**   
 (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.05)   
        
Log pseudolikelihood  -13.58  -47.05  -47.01  -109.80 
Wald χ²  142.18 67.99 174.60 173.85 
Prob > Wald χ²  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R²  0.90  0.68  0.68  0.50 
        
Observations 195  213  213  213 
P-values in parentheses (adjusted for host country clusters) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 3: Meth Panel recommendation versus EB decision 
 
 EB  decision 
Methpanel recommendation  No  Yes  Total 
No 120  1  121 
Yes 2  88  90 
Total 122  89  211 
 
Regression 2 replicates Regression 1 with the new Meth Panel variable. We now also find 
significant coefficients for methodologies developed by international organizations (IO) and 
  10by consultants whose governments are represented in the EB. The IO variable has the 
expected positive impact, i.e. when the World Bank develops a methodology, this 
methodology has a higher chance to be accepted by the EB (at a given level of technical and 
scientific quality, as measured by the initial Meth Panel recommendation).  
 
For consultants whose governments are represented in the EB, the coefficient is negative. As 
opposed to our hypothesis, it appears rather disadvantageous for consultancies if their country 
has a seat in the EB. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional host and buyer country 
variables. In Regressions 3 and 4 we include FDI in- and outflows as an example.  
 
Regression  4 differs from Regression  3 in that it does not use the dichotomous outcome 
variable, but the more elaborate categorical variable which also takes into account 
intermediate assessments of the EB. Now again, apart from the initial Meth Panel 
recommendation, most variables are insignificant. The regression is generally less well 
specified as indicated by a much lower likelihood and less convincing values in Ramsey’s 
Reset test
1 which indicates some significance of a squared term (not shown).  
 
All in all, Table  2 shows that the impact of political-economic variables is not very 
pronounced in EB decisions on methodologies. While we do find the expected effect of 
stricter assessments over time as well as – at least in two regressions – the expected positive 
effect of the World Bank, we do not find any positive effect of host or buyer countries 
represented in the EB, and for consultants represented by their governments the effect is 
negative rather than positive. The most dominant explanatory variable is our control for the 
effective quality of the methodology as indicated by the Meth Panel recommendation. 
Generally the EB adopts this recommendation and, if at all there is divergence, this rather 
tends to make the assessment stricter than the Meth Panel’s initial assessment. 
 
Interestingly, however, whether or not there is divergence, appears to be related to the 
political relevance of the methodology in terms of its applicability to different countries. In 
this context, the direction of the divergence does not seem to matter. Coding a simple dummy 
variable to indicate divergence and relating it on our variable for political variance in a 
bivariate logistic regression framework yields an odds ratio of 1.8, significant at the 1% level. 
This implies that the more limited the applicability of the methodology, i.e. the higher the 
competition effect and thus the political relevance, the higher the chances that some 
divergence of views arises in the first place. 
 
One might also wonder, whether the lack of significance for most political-economic 
variables could not be related to the problem that Meth Panel decisions are themselves not 
free from political considerations. If EB decisions were somehow anticipated by Meth Panel 
recommendations, it would not be surprising that they are so much in line with the latter. In 
this case, Meth Panel recommendations used in our above regressions may be an endogenous 
variable and misleading if introduced as a control. Indeed, even though the Meth Panel is a 
body of experts, it is not fully free from EB influence because the chair himself is an EB 
member, and there are frequent complaints from independent Meth Panel members about this 
linkage. 
 
                                                 
1 In the basic version of Ramsey’s Reset test which is used here, the dependent variable is regressed on its own 
predicted values from the main regression and their squares. If the initial model is well specified, the coefficient 
of the predicted values should be highly significant while the square term should not contain any additional 
information and thus be insignificant. 
  11We dealt with this problem in various ways. First, we considered instrumenting the quality of 
the methodology with host country tertiary education. However, the correlation between Meth 
Panel decisions and tertiary education is so low (ρ=0.099) that we decided to abandon this 
approach. We then considered using the difference between the assessments of both 
committees as the dependent variable thereby moving our potentially endogenous control 
variable to the left hand side of the regression. This does not substantially alter the results 
from Table 2.  
 
Finally, we decided to consider Meth Panel decisions themselves as our dependent variable. 
The results are presented in Table 4. Now, economic measures of openness and investment 
attractiveness such as trade and FDI turn out to be significant, although the effect is 
quantitatively not very relevant. As shown in Regression  7 where marginal effects are 
presented along with coefficient estimates, for example, a one billion US$ increase in host 
country FDI inflows raises the chances of a methodology to obtain a positive recommendation 
by just 0.6% (evaluated at the mean of all independent variables).  
 
Another interesting policy variable with a significant coefficient is the duration of the decision 
about a methodology. The longer the period between initial submission and final decision, the 
higher the chances of the methodology to eventually receive a favorable evaluation. This may 
be related to the time of diverse lobbies to intervene in the process. 
 
In addition, just as for EB decisions, it clearly turns out that assessments have become stricter 
over time. In the context of Meth Panel decisions, time is measured by the serial number of 
the rounds.  
 
However, just as before, we do not find any positive influence of EB membership. To the 
contrary, if distinguishing between members and alternates, we even find a negatively 
significant coefficient. As shown in Regression 7, if the host country is an EB member, and 
all other variables are kept at their mean, the methodology has a 19% lower chance to be 
approved by the Meth Panel.   
 
Anyway, all results from Table 4 have to be interpreted with caution as we do not have any 
satisfying control for the quality of the methodology here. In Regressions 6-8, we introduce a 
partial control for the aspect of additionality. The variable classifies methodologies in the 
additionality categories 1: bad, 2: doubts, and 3: ok. It is based on the subjective assessment 
of an external observer, an assessment which is available for 140 of the methodologies in our 
dataset.
2 This variable is highly significant, but we must be aware that there are other relevant 
technical aspects of the quality of a methodology which may be correlated with some 
explanatory variables (e.g. host FDI inflows or trade) and bias our results. 
 
Summing up our discussion of decision making on methodologies, we can say that the 
relevance of political-economic variables is rather limited. While there is evidence of a time 
dependency, for the relevance of IO involvement, and, to some extent, for the impact of 
economic variables which may make the CDM generally more attractive for investors, EB 
members do not tend to decide in their own favor or in favor of their constituencies. This 
result does not change even if we consider that Meth Panel recommendations may themselves 
be endogenous. 
 
                                                 
2 We thank Daisuke Hayashi from “Perspectives Climate Change” for allowing us to use his additionality 
assessment.  
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0-2 (2 is best, 
0 is rejected or 
withdrawn) 
Additionality (external assessment)    0.44***  0.43 / 0.17***  0.42*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Host country is EB member or alternate  -0.13  -0.41     
 (0.66)  (0.13)     
Host country is EB member      -0.50 / -0.19*  -0.34 
     (0.06)  (0.11) 
Buyer country is EB member or alternate  -0.03  -0.07     
 (0.92)  (0.86)     







Consultant is an international organization  0.30  0.04     
 (0.41)  (0.92)     
Round of Meth Panel decision making  -0.03*  -0.05***  -0.05 / -0.02**  -0.04* 
 (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
FDI, net inflows into host country 









Trade (imports+exports of host country, 









Days from submission to end mark  0.00***  0.00***  0.00 / 0.001***  0.00*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant -0.92***  -1.72***  -1.74***   
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
        
Log pseudolikelihood  -111.49  -78.03  -78.19  -124.45 
Wald χ²  35.44 100.06 82.20  79.58 
Prob > Wald χ²  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R²  0.12  0.19  0.19  0.10 
        
Observations 184  140  140  140 
P-values in parentheses (adjusted for host country clusters) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
+ For Regression 7 (preferred regression) marginal effects are presented in addition to coefficient estimates. They 
are evaluated at the mean. For the variable “Host country is EB member” dF/dx is for the discrete change of the 
dummy variable from 0 to 1. P>|z| corresponds to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0. 
 
 
4.2. EB decisions on individual projects 
 
We will now analyze, whether this result also holds in the case of individual project decisions 
where the transparency of the decision making process is much more limited. 
 
Even a first preliminary look at descriptive statistics suggests that this is not the case. In fact, 
various explanatory variables related to EB membership cannot even be introduced into our 
multivariate regressions because there is no variance in outcomes. Thus, all 29 projects for 
which the World Bank was the credit buyer successfully achieved their registration. Similarly, 
in all 15 cases in which the host country was represented as an alternate EB member, the 
  13corresponding projects were registered. And finally, in all 7 cases in which the validator’s 
government was represented in the EB, projects were registered, too. 
 
Of course, we have to keep in mind that these numbers are comparatively small as compared 
to the overall number of projects, and that overall – as opposed to decisions on methodologies 
– rejections are a rather rare and affect only 6.1% of all projects. 
 
Let us therefore move to our more general econometric assessment. Results are presented in 
Table 5.  
 
Again, one of the major econometric concerns is how to properly control for the effective 
quality of a project. Using host country tertiary enrolment rates as a proxy (Regression 9) 
does not show any significant link to EB decision making at all, which leaves us with some 
doubts about the adequacy of this variable for this purpose, and thus about this regression 
specification as a whole. In all other regressions, we use the assessment of project quality in 
line with RIT criteria as described in Section 3. This variable is highly significant throughout 
and seems to capture the actual effect of quality rather well. 
 
In all these regressions, host country EB membership now turns out to be positively 
significant. Marginal effects displayed in Regression 11 suggest that host country membership 
increases the probability of a project to be registered by about 4% (evaluated at the mean). 
The size of the effect is reduced, however, when other host country variables are taken into 
account (see Regression 12). 
 
Buyer country membership shows a positive coefficient as well, which becomes at least close 
to significant in most regressions. It is in fact significant at the 10% level in Regression 11 
where buyer country EB membership and the buyer being an IO are considered jointly in a 
single dummy variable. As the IO variable cannot be controlled for separately in the 
regression, looking at buyer country membership alone includes IO buyers in the control 
group and therefore blurs the result. This is avoided by the use of the joint dummy variable. 
Nevertheless, even in Regression 11, the size of the effect is rather small. 
 
Just as in the case of methodologies, we also find that EB decisions have become stricter over 
time. This result is highly significant across all regression specifications. 
 
Moreover, in Regression 12, we find some evidence for the importance of variables indicating 
the economic relevance of the project – in general, as well as for the host or buyer country 
individually. Thus, in line with our expectations, small projects which do not lead to relevant 
competition effects, have a significantly higher chance to be registered. Moreover, if the 
buyer countries’ Kyoto gap is large, i.e. their need for the CDM is high, their chances to have 
their projects accepted by the EB increase. Finally, the overall amount of CO2 emissions of a 
host country, a figure that indicates the economic potential of the market, is also positively 
related to projects being registered. 
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  EB final  
decision 
 (yes=1, no=0)






EB final  
decision 
 (yes=1, no=0) 
EB decisions, 
0-4 (4: directly 
accepted, 
0: rejected or 
withdrawn) 
Host country tertiary 
enrolment (2000, % gross) 
0.01 
(0.31) 




Project quality    0.90***  0.90 / 0.01*** 1.09 / 0.01***  0.51*** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 












Buyer country is EB member 
or alternate 
0.51 0.52       
 (0.16)  (0.16)       
Buyer country is EB 
member/alternate or IO 
    0.64 / 0.007* 
(0.09) 




Year of EB decision  -0.49***  -0.60***  -0.59 / 0.01*** -0.78 / -0.004**  -1.12*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Small project        0.50 / 0.002*  0.20 
       (0.09)  (0.33) 
Kyoto gap (predicted, 2008-
2012, million t CO2 eq.) 




FDI, net outflows from buyer 
country (2000, % of GDP) 




FDI, net inflows into host 
country (2000, % of GDP) 




Trade (imports+exports of 
host country, 2000, %of GDP) 




Host country CO2 emissions 
2000 (kt) 




Constant 985.92***  1212.18***  1188.54***  1558.70**   
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)   
          
Log pseudolikelihood  -180.65  -125.22  -124.19  -111.18  -491.00 
Wald χ²  13.27 124.26  130.19 839.35 342.28 
Prob > Wald χ²  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Pseudo R²  0.07  0.36  0.36  0.43  0.19 
          
Observations 876  877  877  875  975 
P-values in parentheses (adjusted for host country clusters) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+ For Regressions  11  and  12 marginal effects are presented in addition to coefficient estimates. They are 
evaluated at the mean. For the variables “Host country is EB member or alternate”, “Buyer country is EB 
member/alternate or IO” and “Small project” dF/dx is for the discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
P>|z| corresponds to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0. 
 
Generally, the results discussed above are less pronounced in the ordered probit regression. 
Only project quality, the year of decision making and host country FDI inflows remain 
significant. This is the case despite the higher number of observations available for the 
analysis in Regression 13. But this higher number is achieved by taking into account projects 
for which no final decision has been taken and which are still under review or correction. 
Here, we should recall that the categories of our categorical dependent variable are based on a 
simple assessment of probabilities for projects to eventually be registered if they have to 
  15undergo such intermediate evaluation or revision processes. Our dependent variable may 
therefore not always capture the situation correctly, which would explain the rather imprecise 
regression results. 
 
We are confident that our independent variables cover the most important determinants of EB 
decision making. Ramsey’s Reset tests for the probit models in Table 5 are satisfactory except 
for Regression 9, which does not directly control for project quality. For the other regressions, 
the squared predicted values are never significant (not even at the 10% level) while the plain 
predicted values are highly significant. Leaving out the political-economic variables, the test 
indicates that important information is missing (not reported here).  
 
Summing up our discussion of individual project decisions we find non-negligible evidence 
for almost all of our initial political-economic hypotheses. Although results are not always 
significant in all relevant specifications and the size of the effects is often rather small, the 
overall picture provides a rather convincing evidence of the relevance of various political-
economic factors for EB decision making. Especially with respect to the variables related to 
EB membership, the results are in striking contrast to the results on EB decisions for 





Based on our econometric analysis of EB decision making over almost 1000 individual CDM 
projects and 250 methodologies, we find that the EB is strongly committed to quality criteria. 
At the same time, our results suggest that a number of political-economic variables also drive 
EB decision making outcomes. This is in line with our theoretical hypotheses. 
 
More specifically, we find that EB decisions tend to favor projects relevant for EB member 
countries (hypothesis 1). This is the case for both host and buyer countries, whereby the role 
of the former is more clearly significant. However, the data does not provide any indication of 
a positive impact of EB membership on decisions about methodologies.  
 
There is mixed evidence for our hypothesis that countries for which the CDM has a high 
potential and countries which are generally powerful players have a higher chance to see their 
projects and methodologies accepted by the EB (hypothesis 2). There is no such evidence for 
methodologies, apart from the results of our analysis of Meth Panel decisions. For CDM 
projects, we observe that host countries with a high overall level of CO2 emissions and thus a 
high potential for CDM investments, just as host countries with a relatively high share of 
human capital seem to be able to obtain registration for a higher share of their projects. At the 
same time, host FDI inflows and trade openness do not improve the probability of projects to 
be registered.  
 
For projects and methodologies alike, the involvement of the World Bank as a powerful 
international player improves the probability of success (hypothesis 3). Moreover, clearly, 
political-economic considerations are more important for EB decisions on individual projects 
than for decisions on methodologies (hypothesis 4). In our argumentation, this has been linked 
to the lack of transparency about the decision making process on individual projects 
(including the lack of transparency about the initial RIT recommendation).  
 
In addition, political-economic considerations appear to be more important for those 
methodologies which are relevant only for a limited number of countries and for big projects 
  16(hypothesis 5). Project regressions clearly show that small projects are registered more easily, 
i.e. without much critical discussion. And in the context of methodologies, we note that 
divergent assessments of the Meth Panel and the EB are observed more frequently when the 
methodology gives rise to competition so that the decision is of higher economic relevance.  
 
Finally, for both methodologies and projects, there is highly consistent evidence that EB 
decision making has become stricter over time (hypothesis 6) along with the increase in the 
stock of methodologies and projects already approved.  
 
As the EB is a rather new institution, its functioning may still be subject to change. This leads 
us to also reflect upon potential institutional improvements which our analysis may suggest. 
Firstly, it has to be recalled that the existing system seems to function rather well. This is the 
case because the predominant determinant of EB decisions appears to be quality, and because 
the influence of political-economic variables is rather limited in size. Nevertheless, the impact 
of the political-economic variables is clearly significant, especially in the case of project 
decisions. With respect to methodologies, only the time dependency and the influence of the 
World Bank are significant. Time dependency, in the sense that initially, EB decision making 
tended to be less strict than in more recent times, does not seem to present any further 
problem for the future. Now that the CDM has become a widely used mechanism, no fall-
back has to be expected. The influence of IOs and, for projects, of other economic and EB 
membership variables, can, however give rise to some concern. Institutional safeguards 
should be put in place to limit their impact. An obvious recommendation in this context would 
be to render the EB decision making process on individual projects more transparent. This 
would also imply a publication of the initial scientific or technical assessment of the RIT. 
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Subject to the need to protect confidential information, the principle of transparency should 
apply to all the work of the Executive Board, encompassing the timely public availability of 
documentation and channels through which external comments by all Parties and all 
UNFCCC accredited observers and stakeholders can be submitted for consideration by the 






Paragraph 16 of the CDM modalities and procedures: 
1. Meetings of the Executive Board shall be open to attendance, as observers, by all Parties 
and by all UNFCCC accredited observers and stakeholders, except where otherwise decided 
by the Executive Board. 
2. In the context of paragraph 1 above, the Executive Board may decide, in the interest of 
economy and efficiency, to limit attendance at its meetings to members, alternate members 
and secretariat support staff. In such instances, the Executive Board shall take all practicable 
steps to accommodate in other ways the interests of Parties, non-Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
that are Parties to the Convention and accredited UNFCCC observers and stakeholders to 
observe its proceedings, except when the Executive Board decides to close all or a portion of 
a meeting. 
 
Source: UNFCCC 2006, Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex I, rules 26 and 27, p. 38.  
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